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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH
In the Matter of the Following
Issuers, their Securities,
Affiliates or Successors,
and/or Entities subsequently
organized by them, including
H & B Carriers, Inc., et al.,
Capital General Corporation,
Petitioners/Appellants

PETITION FOR WRIT OF
CERTIORARI
Docket No,
Ct of App No. 910196-CA
Priority No. 13.

vs
Utah Securities Division, and the
Department of Business Regulation,
Respondents/Appellees.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI OF FINAL DECISION OF THE
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
Appellant, by and through counsel, pursuant to Rules 43 and
46, Rules of Appellate Procedure, files this Petition for Writ of
Certiorari.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Petitioners present three issues for review:
1. Assuming a violation of the provisions of the Utah
Securities Act in the sale of securities to the public without
registration, do the statutory remedies granted to the Utah
Securities Division include thereafter taking from the then owners
of the securities all transactional exemptions granted to them by
Section 61-1-14(2), U.C.A. (1953, as amended), so that they can
never sell their securities, even though a statutory exemption
from registration may be applicable?
Although such action of the Division was upheld by the Court
of Appeals, not only is there no authorization for such in
the provisions of the Utah Uniform Securities Act, but to the
contrary the remedy/penalty provisions of the Act are
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directed only at punishing violators and not the current
security holders who may have purchased from an illegal
seller. It is true that the suspension order does not
specifically name the many individual security holders, but
the effect of suspending all transactional exemptions
nevertheless effectively prevents anyone from using them,
now or at any time in the future.
2. Does Section 61-1-7, U.C.A. (1953, as amended) which
prohibits the sale of securities without registration also
prohibit gifts of securities without registration, especially in
light of the case of Andrews v. Chase, 49 P.2d 938 (Utah 1935)?
The Court of Appeals has answered "yes" to this question
notwithstanding (1) the plain meaning of the words gift and
sale, and (2) the case of Andrews v. Chase, a case on all
fours with this case as to the specific issue, in which this
Court held that the statute prohibiting sales of securities
without registration specifically did not prohibit gifts.
3. Was the affirmation by the Court of Appeals of the
imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, a significant departure from the usual and accepted
course of judicial proceedings in light of Appellant's arguments
that the Andrews case is controlling, that there is no authority
in the Utah Code for the action taken by the Appellee in issuing
and upholding the suspension order, and Appellant's other
arguments?
At least three valid reasons, as will be discussed below, show
that the Appellant's arguments in the District Court were
warranted by existing law and were not interposed for any
improper purpose. For the Court of Appeals to rubber stamp
the sanctions imposed by the District Court is an improper
deviation from the usual and accepted course of judicial
proceedings.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Review is sought of a February 10, 1992 decision rendered by
the Utah Court of Appeals.

A Petition for Rehearing was filed on

February 24, 1992. The Court of Appeals denied the petition on
March 9, 1992. The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review
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March 9, 1992. The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review
this matter by a Writ of Certiorari pursuant to Section 78-22(5), Utah Code Annotated, (1953, as amended).
CONTROLLING STATUTES
Appellant believes the following statutes and rules to be
controlling in this matter.

However, due to their length, they

will be printed as part of the addendum (All statutory references
are to the Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended)):
Section 61-1-7
Section 61-1-14(2)

Section 61-1-13(15)(c)(ii)
Section 61-1-20

Section 61-1-14(3)

Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant requests the issuance of a Writ of Certiorari for
the purpose of reviewing the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals
upholding the order of the Utah Securities Division suspending all
Section 61-1-14(2), U.C.A. transactional exemptions applicable, or
which at any time thereafter may become applicable, to trades by
the securities holders of H & B Carriers, Inc., its affiliates and
successors, and 46 other corporations.
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
On December 1, 1987 the Utah Securities Division brought a
petition pursuant to the Utah Uniform Securities Act, 61-1-14(3),
U.C.A. to suspend all Section 61-1-14(2) transactional exemptions
applicable, or which at any time thereafter may become applicable,
as to the securities of H & B Carriers, Inc. and 46 other Utah
corporations because the securities had been gifted to members of
the public without prior registration. The agency asserted that
such gifts violated the registration provisions of the Utah
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An order of suspension was issued on December 1, 1987 with
respect to the securities of these companies.

Appellant Capital

General Corporation as an interested party, being the party who
made the gifts of stock, requested that the matter be set for
hearing.

Hearing was held on January 20, 1988 at which time

evidence and testimony was offered and received (R. at 8).
An Administrative Law Judge affirmed the December 1, 1987
suspension order on April 15, 1988. The Executive Director of the
Department of Business Regulations approved the affirmation on
April 27, 1988. The Securities Advisory Board approved the
affirmation on April 26, 1988 (R. at 8-14).

Thereafter, Appellant

filed a timely petition for review in the Third District Court for
Salt Lake County (Petition for Review, R. at 2-5).
Thereafter, but prior to action being taken by the District
Court, a related case was decided by the Utah Court of Appeals
which affirmed a suspension order in a prior but related case,
Capital General Corp. v. Utah Department of Business Regulations.
777 P.2d 494 (Utah Ct. App, 1989), cert denied, 781 P.2d 878 (Utah
1989), (hereinafter referred to as "Amenity", the name of the
company whose securities trading exemptions were at issue in that
case).
The District Court upheld the Final Order of the Appellee on
September 10, 1990 (R. at 101-107).

A Motion for New Trial was

filed on September 20, 1990 (R. at 113-114) and that motion was
denied on November 20, 1990 (R. at 134-136).
filed on December 10, 1990 (R. at 156-157).

Notice of Appeal was
The Utah Court of

Appeals affirmed the Securities Advisory Board on February 10,
1992.

A Petition for Rehearing was denied on March 9, 1992.
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C. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Appellant Capital General Corporation, at various times in and
prior to 1986, with others, incorporated the 47 corporations at
issue

In 1986 Appellant made gifts of the stock of these

corporations to various individuals with whom Capital General had
been associated. (R. at 8). None of the securities which were
given away were registered with the Utah Securities Division, nor
was registration sought.

Further, no exemptions from registration

requirements were sought or issued with respect to the gifting of
those securities (R. at 8-9).
Prior to making the gifts of stock, the president of Capital
General inquired of the Utah Securities Division as to whether
gifts of stock were exempt from registration.

He also checked

with the Securities Division of the State of Nevada in addition to
obtaining various legal opinions.

He was always advised that

gifts of stock need not be registered since such was required only
for sales of stock. (Evidence file, Transcript of 1/20/88 Hearing
at 66-76).
Capital General relied on this advice and didn't register the
stock but made the intended gifts to many individuals with whom
the company had dealt.

No consideration was ever received or

expected in exchange for the gifts of stock.

The gifts were made

without any obligation on the part of the recipients (Evidence
file, Transcript of 1/20/88 Hearing at 66-76).
The President of Capital General also testified at the initial
hearing in January 1988 that he had received "no-action" letters
from eleven different states, which indicated that there were no
rules against gifting unregistered stock in those states.
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(Evidence file, Transcript of 1/20/88 Hearing at 76).
Based upon all of these investigations, Capital General was
confident that no registration requirements would be violated in
making the gifts, (Evidence file, Transcript of 1/20/88 Hearing at
70-71).

However, the Utah Securities Division later took the

position that the gifts were sales in violation of Section 61-17, U.C.A. and suspended all trading exemptions that were currently
applicable or that forever after may become applicable.

The order

effectively and perpetually stopped all further trading of the
stock of these companies, whether or not statutorily defined
exemptions were applicable or ever would become applicable.
ARGUMENT
Point One
A WRIT OF CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED BECAUSE THE COURT OF
APPEALS HAS IGNORED THE CLEAR MEANING OF A STATUTE AND THUS
SANCTIONED AN INVALID USE OF A STATUTE
The Court of Appeals upheld the suspension order of the
Appellee.

In this case, as well as in the Amenity decision, the

lower courts appear to have totally misunderstood the difficulty
presented by what the Utah Securities Division has done in
suspending all transactional exemptions in the securities of the
47 companies.

The scope of the suspension order goes far beyond

the statutory authority given the Division and clearly is not a
proper remedy for a violation of Section 61-1-7, as claimed.
It is critical that the Court understand the regulatory scheme
of the Securities Act.

Section 7 prohibits sales of securities

unless they are registered or exempt from registration.

Section

14(2) lists 17 transactional exemptions, that is, 17 specific
transactions that are exempt from registration, for example, a
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sale that does not involve offering to the public.

By examining

said 17 exempt transactions (subparagraphs (a) - (q) of Section
61-1-14(2)) it is clear that the legislative intent was to exempt
them for the reason that the public did not need the protection
afforded by registration in such situations.
Appellee found Appellant to have sold securities to the public
without registration or exemption and therefore to have violated
Section 7.

Although this is contested, let us assume arguendo

that such was the case, that is, in 1986 Appellant sold
unregistered securities in the 47 companies to members of the
public in violation of Section 7.

Having learned of this

violation, the Utah Securities Division suspended all applicable
Section 14(2) transactional exemptions, or those which may at any
time in the future become applicable, respecting the securities of
those companies.

The effect of this is that if you happened to be

one who purchased the illegally sold stock, the Division's order
stops you from ever reselling it to anyone else, even if one or
more of the 17 exempted situations apply or later becomes
applicable.

There is nothing in Section 14 or anywhere in the

Securities Act to indicate that the legislature could possibly
have intended such a bizarre result.

Whether stock was sold

illegally in the first instance should have nothing to do with the
rights of current stock holders to avail themselves of statutorily
granted exemptions, particularly when it is obvious that the types
of transactions described in Section 14(2) were carved out as
exemptions from registration because registration would serve no
useful purpose.
Nevertheless, Appellee claimed authority for its suspension
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order in Section 14(3), which section does indeed grant the
Division power to "deny" or "revoke" any of said 17 exemptions
following notice and a hearing.
are:

The crucial questions that emerge

Under what circumstances does it have power to do that?

What are the criterion?

Obviously the legislature did not intend

for the Division to have power to revoke or deny exemptions at its
pleasure, without any criteria, or it would not have required
notice and a hearing.
The applicable section, Section 61-1-14(3), unfortunately does
not list any criteria.

As a result one must obtain this

information by considering all of the relevant sections of the Act
as they interact with each other in the regulation of securities.
Since a hearing is required, it is clear that certain findings
must be made at the hearing before any power can be invoked.
Appellant's position is that in order to "revoke" or "deny" an
exemption, that finding must establish a violation of Section 14
by the person seeking the exemption and with respect to the
particular exemption sought.

Nothing in the? statute allows a

blanket suspension of all exemptions, those which may become
applicable in the future, nor especially prevention of parties who
have had nothing to do with any violations from utilizing
applicable exemptions.
There are five reasons, from the provisions of the Act, that
conclusively establish Appellant's said position:
1.

There is nothing in Section 14(3) that states or suggests

that it was designed to be as all encompassing and far reaching as
to allow a suspension of all exemptions, based on a violation of a
different section of the Act (by different parties even!).
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2.

One might well ask why the drafters of Section 14(3) would

set up the hearing requirement and not list the criteria.

A

reading of the entire Section 14 would suggest that it was most
probably because they assumed the reader would naturally
understand that the remedy portion of the section, i.e.
subparagraph (3), had direct relation to and was dependent upon
the substantive portions, i.e., the descriptions of the available
exemptions in subparagraphs (1) and (2). In other words, the
statutory scheme of the drafters was that if someone is
erroneously claiming a particular one of the 17 exemptions, the
way to find out is to set up a hearing and deny it if the error is
established at the hearing.

Nowhere in Section 14 or elsewhere in

the Act is there language to imply or suggest anything beyond
that.
3.

That the remedy of Section 14(3) is limited to Section 14

applications is further established by the wording of Section 7,
the section claimed to have been violated by Appellant.

Under

Section 7, securities can be legally sold only if they are
registered or the transaction is exempt, i.e., if the transaction
is one of those described in Section 14(2)(a) through (q),
mentioned above.

The either/or posture of Section 7 makes it

clear that the Section 14 exemptions apply only to unregistered
stock.

Yet the opinion of the Court of Appeals amounts to just

the opposite, i.e., the Court has in effect stated that the
exemptions of Section 14 that may otherwise be applicable must be
suspended because this stock is in the hands of the public in an
unregistered condition.

Again, it is seen in the specific wording

of the 17 exempted types of transactions that the very purpose of
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Section 14 and the exemptions is to allow people with unregistered
stock, regardless of how they obtained it (but assuming for the
sake of argument that they are innocent, as at least 99% of the
stockholders in the present matter certainly are), to dispose of
it under the circumstances there described.

And these

circumstances are those in which the legislature has deemed that
the benefits of registration are not needed.

It appears that the

Court of Appeals may be of the opinion that because the several
hundred stockholders received their unregistered stock in
transactions in which the Appellant violated Section 7, that
somehow that has tainted the securities for all time, and that is
why it is justifiable to allow the blanket suspension.

If so,

this is an unsupported supposition inasmuch as no provision
anywhere in the Act, states, suggests or implies anything close to
such a concept.

In fact the specific circumstances described in

the 17 described exempted transactions are greatly in conflict
with such a concept, i.e., in every exempted circumstance
described, the basis for the exemption involves only the issues of
protection to the new purchaser and not whether some prior
purchaser in the chain had bought it without the benefit of
registration or other exemption.*
1

Section 14(2)(j)(ii) may at first glance appear to be an
exception to this since it specifically restricts the application
of the (j) exemption if the existing security holders acquired
their shares in a transaction in violation of Section 7. Not so,
however, because the restriction applies only to a new issue by the
issuer and not to resale by the security holders. Nevertheless,
this provision is highly significant in the present discussion
because it corroborates completely Appellant's position above, towit: Since it specifies a particular fact situation that would
defeat that particular exemption, it follows that the same fact
situation is not the criteria that would defeat the other 17
exemptions. That specific fact situation is also the one found by
the Division in the present case, i.e., that securities were
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The logic of this is very compelling.

After all, what does

the fact that John Doe may have been duped into purchasing an
unregistered or unexempted security have to do with whether he
should be allowed to sell it sometime in the future provided that
he complies with the law.
4.

It is significant to note that Section 14(3) grants power

to "deny" or "revoke11 any exemption, but does not grant power to
"suspend."

Nor does it grant this power with respect to "any and

all exemptions," but only with respect to "any exemption."
Granted, it can be argued, within the meaning of proper word
usage, that if one is given power to act with respect to "any" he
can add up all the "anys" so that he can act with respect to
"all."

However, when all three words in the provision are

considered together, it is clear what the legislature had in mind,
and it was not a blanket suspension of all. The word "deny" is
commonly used in response to a request.

"Revoke" is to cancel

something that has already been effectuated.

It seems that the

Division must have realized this when it issued its order and
therefore did not use the statutory language of "deny" (because
nothing had been requested) or "revoke" (because no one had
attempted to use any of the 17 exemptions so that such could be
revoked), and instead just went ahead and issued a blanket
suspension to be effective forever in the future (which power is
received in a transaction in violation of Section 7. Thus, by the
wording of the statute itself, we see that a finding of a Section 7
violation in the distribution of the stock cannot itself be used as
the criteria for denying or revoking an exemption. And with that
falls the Appellee's whole case, as the finding that the Appellant
made the illegal distribution is not relevant to the Section 14
exemptions unless under (j), Appellant were to attempt to make a
like distribution to the same shareholders, and in that event, the
(j) exemption could legitimately be denied following a hearing.
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not authorized in the statutory language).

Thus, it is seen why

the drafters used "any" instead of "any and all" or "all," as it
was contemplated that an individual seeking the benefits of
Section 14 exemptions certainly wouldnft attempt to rely on all 17
(because the factual circumstances described in each are too
dissimilar) and that a revocation or denial hearing pursuant to
14(3) would necessarily be specific as to the particular exemption
claimed.
5.

In the paragraphs above, Appellant has given a number of

reasons based on the specific applicable statutory language in
support of its position.

These are all bolstered by the fact that

acceptance of Appellant's position does not leave the Division
without adequate remedy.

Sections 20 and 21 grant authority to

the Division to bring about very severe penalties for selling
stock without registration or exemption, including such things as
rescission, fines, disgorgement of profits, injunctions and
criminal penalties.

How could it be more clear that this is the

way the legislature intended that violations of the Act, such as
sales in violation of Section 7, would be punished?

Somebody

makes an illegal sale - so maybe they'll have to disgorge the
profits or have it rescinded, etc.

It makes a lot of sense.

Sections 20 and 21 start out with words to the effect that these
are the remedies the Division has for "a violation of this
chapter."

The legislature's specifying such in these sections but

not in Section 14(3) sends a clear message that such was not
intended to apply to 14(3) also.
In the companion case, Amenity, the Court of Appeals appeared
to recognize the correctness of Appellant's above argument with
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respect to why Section 14(3) doesn't give the necessary authority,
but the Court concluded that it was harmless error for the
Division to have proceeded under Section 14 instead of Section 20.
Appellant would have no problem with the harmless error argument
if Section 20 granted authority for the blanket/forever
suspension, i.e., Appellant would not seek to take advantage of a
mere technicality of the Division inadvertently proceeding under
the wrong section.

However, the problem is that there is no

language in Section 20 to empower the Division to order the
blanket/forever suspension either.
The Court of Appeals attempts to justify its ruling that
Section 20 provides enabling power by pointing out that Section 20
provides that when someone has violated the Act, the Division is
empowered to either issue a show cause order to cease and desist
or seek a district court injunction.

It is respectfully submitted

that this constitutes power to order that the violation stop, and
nothing more.

It is simple:

If a person has violated the Act

(e.g., selling unregistered securities to members of the public),
then this provision quoted by the Court empowers the Division to
enjoin further violations in a court action, or enter its own
cease and desist order with respect to such.
authorizes nothing more.

That's all.

It

It says nothing about any power to

suspend trading of the stock already purchased or received by the
stockholders, i.e., the victims of the Section 7 violator's
illegal sales. And as alluded to above in the discussions under
Section 14, no valid reason exists for such, i.e., the statutory
scheme throughout is aimed at stopping or punishing the violator
and helping the victim.

It is hard to imagine how the legislature
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could have more clearly spelled out that Section 20 remedies are
aimed solely at the perpetrator and have no affect whatsoever on
securities after the illegal seller has sold to the victims.

It

goes against all logic and accepted rules of English usage to
conclude, as did the Court of Appeals, that because the Division
has power to order the Section 7 violator to cease making illegal
sales, it therefore has power to issue an eternal and all reaching
suspension order preventing victims of prior illegal sales (and
other stockholders who were not victims) from utilizing Section 14
exemptions with respect to their stock.
Point Two
A WRIT OF CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE
DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS IN CONFLICT A PRIOR DECISION
OF THIS COURT, NAMELY ANDREWS V, CHASE, 89 Utah 51, 49 P.2d 938
(1935).
The Court of Appeals upheld the ruling of the Appellee that
the Appellant's gifts of stock were in fact sales, and hence were
in violation of the registration requirements of Section 61-1-7.
Although no one questioned that the transfers of stock without
consideration were in fact gifts in the normal sense and usage of
the word, the lower court has nevertheless ruled them to be sales
on the theory that by making the gifts Appellant put itself in a
better position to realize subsequent value from the corporation
because of thereafter having a public company. In doing so, it
ignored the case of Andrews v. Chase, 49 P.2d 938 (Utah 1935), the
holding of which is controlling on this issue.
Andrews involved the exact same question as this case on the
gift/sale issue.

In that case, as here, stock was gifted to

members of the public, and it was claimed that such gifts violated
the securities act then in effect.

That act was basically

identical to the present act in that it prohibited sales of
securities without registration (and also defined sale as a
disposition for value).

The Supreme Court rejected the claim that

the gifts were sales and held there was no violation of the Act
even though it was pointed out that the gifted stock in that case
was assessable stock which amounted to a direct value to be
received from the giftees if they paid their subsequently levied
assessments.

The Court followed time honored principles of

statutory construction and held:
The stock here involved is not one of the kinds of
securities which are exempt from the provisions of the
Securities Act. Appellant does not contend otherwise. What
he does contend is that the Act merely regulates the sale of
securities and has no application whatever to securities which
are given away. It will be observed that "sale or sell" is
defined as every disposition for value. The words "for value"
are descriptive of, and constitute a limitation on, the kind
of transactions which the Securities Act was intended to
regulate. It is a cardinal rule of the construction of a
statute that, when possible, effect must be given to all the
language the legislature used in the Act. If the legislature
had intended the words "sale or sell" should include "gift or
give," it would not have limited the former words to such
dispositions, or attempted disposals of securities as are made
for value... Had the law making power intended that the Act
should apply to gifts or securities, it would have been a
simple matter to have so provided.
49 P.2d at 941 (Emphasis added).
Appellant submits that that language and holding of Andrews
have never been overruled.

It is still valid and should remain

such. It applies directly to and is controlling in this case.
The Court of Appeals1 opinion does not respond specifically to
Appellant's arguments that Andrews is controlling, but relies on
its holding in the companion case, Amenity, (which does attempt to
distinguish Andrews and give reasons for not following it) in
holding that Appellant's gifts of stock were in reality sales and
therefore prohibited by the Act.

In attempting to distinguish
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Andrews, the Court of Appeals states that its most "compelling"
reason for not following it is that it claims that it was
overruled by the legislature by the subsequent enactment of
Section 61-l-15(c)(ii), stating, "a purported gift of assessable
stock is an offer or sale..," Amenity at 497, footnote 3.
Granted, it is obvious that the quoted section was enacted to
overrule the result in Andrews should someone again attempt to
obtain funds from the public from assessments of assessable stock
he had gifted to them.

Obviously the legislature didn't want

stock to be given away with those kinds of strings attached, i.e.,
the giftees having to pay the assessments or lose the gift (which
is tantamount to a "sale" though not really a sale without the
subsequent additional language in the statute).
However, it doesn't follow that the subsequently enacted
language was intended to, or in fact did, overrule any other part
of Andrews.

Rather, this language shows that the holding of the

case and the sound basis on which the case was decided - that
words in a statute mean what they say, that a gift really isn't a
sale without a specific statutory declaration that it is - has
been left totally intact inasmuch as the new language was limited
only to "purported gifts of assessable stock."

Andrews remains

fully applicable for all other kinds of gifts. And it should also
be pointed out that not only were Capital General's gifts not of
assessable stock, but they were real and bona fide gifts and not
"purported" ones.
Further, Appellant is concerned with the Court of Appeals'
reasoning at the end of its discussion where it attempts to
distinguish the facts of Andrews on a present benefit vs. hope of
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future benefit theory.

The Court claims that the assessable stock

situation is only a hope in the future, whereas in the present
case, the gifts create an immediate and certain benefit to the
giver.

In the first place, on the particular point raised the

facts are not distinguishable as claimed, that is, in both cases
the gifts were made to large numbers of the public thereby
creating public companies.

There really is no difference between

the two cases on this point.

Second, the premise is wrong, i.e.,

the claimed "immediate actual benefit" of a public company is in
reality only a potential for benefit, as everyone in the
securities business knows, and in fact, the likelihood of payment
of assessments from the owners of the assessable shares would
probably be a greater likelihood.
And finally, though the cases are not distinguishable on the
point mentioned in the Court of Appeals' opinion, they are
distinguishable in that the benefit flows directly from the
giftees in the Andrews case, whereas the potential benefits in the
situation in the present case become reality only upon the further
efforts of the givers (infusion of assets, work to make the
company viable, etc.).

In other words, the only truly

distinguishing feature between Andrews and the present case would
have the exact opposite affect to what was opined by the Court of
Appeals, i.e., the gift in which the giftee has to pay something
to retain it (assessable stock) more closely resembles an actual
sale rather that the other way around (non assessable stock).

But

despite the close resemblance in Andrews between a gift of
assessable stock and a sale, since the legislature had not
required the registration of gifts, the Utah Supreme Court wisely
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and judiciously refused to read words into the legislative
enactment.
The Court of Appeals erred in going beyond the meaning of the
plain words of the statute and by ignoring the holding of Andrews.
For this reason, this Court should grant the petition for a
Writ of Certiorari.
POINT THREE
A WRIT OF CERTIORARI SHOULD BE ISSUED BECAUSE BY UPHOLDING
THE SANCTIONS OF THE DISTRICT COURT, THE COURT OF APPEALS IGNORED
THE STANDARDS REQUIRED BY RULE 11, UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
The Appellant had at least three good reasons for continuing
its appeal from the final order of the Utah Securities Division,
despite the outcome of the Amenity decision.
First, the Appellant believed that the District Court and the
Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the Andrews decision was
no longer valid.

It was entirely proper to continue the appeal in

light of the argument that Andrews controls in this case.
Appellant had and has no other options than to convince this Court
to issue a Writ of Certiorari to declare that its decision in
Andrews is still valid law.
Second, relative to the issue of the statutory authority of
the Appellee to issue the suspension order, in Amenity, the Court
of Appeals indicated that even if Appellant is correct in stating
that Section 61-1-14(3) does not give the Utah Securities Division
authority for the suspension, Section 61-1-20 does.

This was the

first time anywhere that it was suggested that Section 61-1-20
gave authority to the Appellee to suspend Section 61-1-14(2)
transactional exemptions.

However, as discussed in Point One

above, this is not a correct conclusion.

Hence, in this case, at
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the District Court level, Appellant had its first opportunity to
argue that neither section gives the necessary statutory authority
sought.

Amenity was decided after this appeal in the District

Court was initiated, but before the ruling of the District Court
Judge.

Appellantfs argument was well grounded in fact and

warranted by existing law, and at worst was a good faith argument
for modification of existing interpretation of the law in light of
Amenity.
Finally, Appellant argued that the gifts of stock were good
faith gifts and introduced evidence at the January 20, 1988
hearing. The Order of the Appellee in effect concluded, however,
that if the magnitude of the gift is significant enough to create
a public company by virtue of gifts of unregistered stock, then
the gifts per se cannot qualify as a "good faith gifts" regardless
of actual good faith and thus are subject to registration. (Record
at page 13). However, if this happens, then the clear meaning of
the words "good faith gift" in the statute is lost and the
question of whether or not a gift of stock was made in good faith
takes on a meaning that has nothing to do with what the statute
says or what people commonly understand and accept good faith to
mean.
Appellant sought to have the District Court review this issue,
particularly in light of evidence, to establish Appellant's good
faith in making the gifts. For example, before making the gifts of
stock, the Appellant's president inquired of the Utah Securities
Division as to whether gifts of stock were exempt from
registration.

He also checked with the Securities Division of the

State of Nevada in addition to obtaining various legal opinions.
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He was consistently advised that gifts of stock need not be
registered.

He even received "no-action" letters from 11

different states indicating that gifted stock need not be
registered. (Evidence file, Transcript of 1/20/88 Hearing at 6676).

Appellant relied on this advice and didn't register the

stock but made the intended gifts. The gifts were made without any
obligation on the part of the recipients (Evidence file,
Transcript of 1/20/88 Hearing at 66-76).

Based upon all of this,

Appellant was confident that no registration requirements would be
violated and that the gifts were good faith gifts (Evidence file,
Transcript of 1/20/88 Hearing at 70-71).
Appellant certainly believed that its position was justified
factually and that there was a good basis for arguing against the
strained interpretation of "good faith gift1" as stated by the Utah
Securities Division.

It had every reason to believe that it met

its factual burden of establishing good faith and that the
Appellee would be reversed at the District Court level.
Accordingly, there was no basis for the Court of Appeals to
uphold the District Court's award of sanctions under Rule 11.
This Court should also grant a Writ of Certiorari relative to this
issue.
Respectfully submitted this 8th day of April, 1992.

Pfiillip' B.~ Shell—^
David H. Day
Day & Barney
Attorneys for Appellant
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Before Judges Garff, Jackson, and Orme.
JACKSON, Judge:
Capital General Corporation (CGC) appeals the trial court's
order which affirmed suspension of all secondary stock trading
exemptions of forty-six corporate entities formed by CGC1 without
registration pursuant to the Utah Uniform Securities Act, Utah

1. CGC appeared before the Division of Securities to challenge
the summary order as an "interested11 party under Utah Code Ann.
§ 61-1-14(3) (1989), and on review as a "person aggrieved by a
final order of the executive director,11 under Utah Code Ann.
§ 61-1-23 (1989).

Code Ann. § 61-1-1 to -30 (1986), and imposed sanctions under
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. We affirm.
ISSUES
CGC's brief acknowledges that our decision in Capital Gen.
Corp. v. Department of Business Reg.. 777 P.2d 494 (Utah App.),
cert, den., 781 P.2d 878 (Utah 1989) (hereinafter Amenity),
regarding the stock of Amenity, Inc. controls certain issues.
But CGC argues that the following issues require new treatment
regarding the stock of forty-six other corporations which it
formed:2 (1) whether the trial court properly applied the
doctrine of collateral estoppel, (2) whether CGC's transfers of
stock were not sales but good faith gifts exempt from
registration, (3) whether statutory authority exists for the
Securities Division to suspend all trading exemptions including
those of stock transferees, and (4) whether the trial court
abused its discretion in imposing Rule 11 sanctions.
FACTS
The parties present this appeal on undisputed facts.
Securities Advisory Board adopted the following pertinent
findings of fact:

The

8. H&B Carriers, Inc. was incorporated under
the laws of the State of Utah on July 1,
1982. That entity was initially known as Y
Travel; Jerry W. Peterson and Mr. Yeaman had

2. The forty-six corporate entities were: H&B Carriers, Inc.,
Florida Growth Industries, Inc., Macaw, Inc., Longhorn
Enterprise, Inc., Koala Corporation, Yahwe Corporation, Star
Dolphin, Inc., Jackal, Inc., Hyena Capital, Inc., Gopher Inc.,
Flamingo Capital, Inc., Egret, Inc., Cetacean Industries, Inc.,
Bonito, Inc., Alpaca, Inc., Zeus Enterprise, Inc., Tamarind,
Inc., Saber, Inc., Radar, Inc., Quiescent, Inc., Vanadium, Inc.,
Upsilon, Inc., Why Not?, Inc., Bestmark, Inc., Missouri Illinois
Mining, Inc., Dogmatic, Inc., Mystic Industries, Inc., Highland
Manufacturing, Inc., Kowtow, Inc., Noble Industries, Inc., Oryan
Capital Corporation, Pegasus Star Enterprise, Inc., Showstoppers,
Inc., Hightide, Inc., Grandeur, Inc., Fantastic Industries, Inc.,
Jugglar, Inc., Xebec Galleon, Inc., Golden Home Health Care
Equipment Centers, Inc., Nighthawk Capital, Inc., Resources
Exploration Data, Inc., Instrument Development Corporation,
Panther Industries, Inc., Owl Enterprises, Inc., Quail, Inc., and
GBS Technologies Corporation.

incorporated Y Travel and the registered
agent of that entity was Ms, Peterson.
9. Similar to Amenity, Inc., H&B Carriers,
Inc. was initially capitalized when Capital
General Corporation transferred $2,000 to it
in exchange for authorized common stock.
Similar to Amenity, Inc., Capital General
Corporation thereafter gifted, to
approximately 700 to 1,000 individuals, a
unit of 100 shares of the stock it had
acquired. Many of the donees were residents
of Utah.
10. None of H&B Carriers, Inc. securities
were registered with the division at the time
those securities were gifted. Further,
neither that corporation nor its securities
were subject to an exemption from
registration requirements pursuant to filing
with the division at that time.
11. Sparing detail, the December 1, 1987
Petition sets forth factual allegations
substantially similar to those identified
above as to the mode of incorporation, the
subsequent acquisition and gifting of stock
in the forty-five (45) other companies under
review. In each case, the essential
transaction consisted of the initial transfer
of securities for a relatively small amount
of money and the gifting of those securities
to numerous individuals. In certain
instances, the gifted securities were
subsequently traded on the secondary market.
None of the corporate entities in question or
the securities which were gifted were
registered with the division and no
exemptions from registration requirements
were ever issued as to those securities.
Upon petition by the Securities Division, all transactional
exemptions applicable to the shares of all forty-six Utah
corporations formed by CGC were ordered suspended by the
executive director. The order was affirmed by an administrative
law judge, the Securities Advisory Board, and the lower court.
CGC had transferred the corporate shares without requesting
either registration or exemption. CGC asserted that the stock
transfers were "gifts" and therefore exempt from regulation.

ANALYSIS
Our analysis will assume arguendo that Amenity does not
provide collateral estoppel regarding the issues now presented.
Here, the Board determined that CGC's transfers of the shares
were sales within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-7 (1986):
[it] is unlawful for any person to offer or
sell any security in this state unless it is
registered under this chapter or the security
or transaction is exempted under § 61-1-14.
In Amenity, we held that transfers of Amenity stock under an
identical scheme were sales and not gifts. The pertinent
language is the definition of an offer or sale as including a
"disposition . . . at a security for value." Utah Code Ann.
§ 61-1-13(15)(a) (1986). Value is present even though the
benefits flow indirectly from the marketplace rather than
directly from the transterees. Amenity, 777 P.2d at 497. By
distributing shares, CGC transformed H&B Carriers, Inc. and the
other forty-five corporations into publicly held corporations
ripe for acquisition. Thus, the Board's determination that CGC's
"gifting" program constituted sales for value was reasonable and
rational.
CGC claims certain testimony regarding "good faith"
distinguishes this case trom Amenity. "Good faith gifts" are
excluded from the detinition of "sale" under Utah Code Ann.
§ 61-1-13(15)(1)(i) (1936). The Board ruled that CGC's transfers
were not good faith gifts. CGC does not cite us to the record
nor any precedent other than Amenity. Mr. Yeaman, CGC's
president, testified regarding his "good faith" efforts not
mentioned in Amenity. He testified that he talked to two
attorneys and called the Utah Securities Division regarding gifts
of stock and was told that the law applied only to sales. On
direct examination he said, "we called and asked what the
provisions were for making gifts." On cross-examination he
stated "as I remember it, it was just a general discussion about
making gifts and what states' views generally is [sic] about
gifting stock." Because this evidence is so general, vague and
uncorroborated, it has little weight or relevance. As in
Amenity, the Board found that CGC's main intent, based on what
was actually done with the stock, was to circumvent the statutory
registration requirements, not to make gifts for the sake of
generosity. Further, evidence of economic self-interest in
promoting the same corporate stock scheme as a regular practice
belies gratuity and innocence. Accordingly, the Board's
conclusion that the stock transfers were not good faith gifts was
reasonable and rational.

CGC's final challenge to the order is that the Securities
Division did not have statutory authority to issue the summary
order. The order stated that "pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section
61-1-14(2), all transactional exemptions that are applicable, or
may hereafter become applicable, are suspended." The Board
concluded that "the distribution of the securities in question
constitutes the unregistered sale of a security violative of
Section 61-1-7."
Subsection (1) of 61-1-14 describes the securities which are
exempted from sections 61-1-7 (registration before sale) and 611-15 (filing of sales literature). Subsection (2) of 61-1-14
describes the transactions which are exempted from the same
requirements. Subsection (3) empowers the division by order to
"deny or revoke" exemptions with respect to "a specific security,
transaction or series of transactions" and sets forth the
hearings procedure which was followed in this matter. Thus,
because neither registration or exemption were in place, the
transactions in these specific securities were unlawful.
Section 61-1-7, registration before sale, provides: "It is
unlawful for any person to offer or sell any security in this
state unless it is registered under this chapter or the security
or transaction is exempted under Section 61-1-14." Since CGC had
not registered the stock and could not claim any exemption, the
transactions were violative of section 61-1-7. Section 61-1-20
authorizes enforcement action by the Securities Division.
"Whenever it appears to the division that any person has engaged,
is engaging, or is about to engage in any act or practice
constituting a violation of this chapter or any rule or order
under this chapter," it may issue a show cause order to cease and
desist or bring a court action for relief. See Utah Code Ann
§ 61-1-20(1)(a)-(d) (1986). The summary order stated:
The entry of an order is in the public
interest because the offer or sale of
securities, which have not been registered
and are not the subject of an appropriate
underlying exemption from registration,
deprives investors of the statutory
protections afforded by the Utah Uniform
Securities Act.
Thus, as in Amenity, the Securities Division had statutory
power to act and substantially complied with the statutory
procedure. See Amenity, 777 P.2d at 498.
The Securities Division filed a motion for Rule 11 sanctions
consisting solely of attorney fees. The trial court entered an
award of $1,395.00. We review the award under an abuse of

discretion
and cannot
making the
(Utah App.

standard. We have reviewed the trial court's action
say that the trial court abused its discretion in
award. See Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163
1989).

Accordingly, we affirm on all issues.
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In the matter of the following
Issuers, their Securities,
Affiliates or Successors,
and/or Entities subsequently
organized by them, including
H & B Carriers, Inc., et al.;
Capital General Corporation,

ORDER DENYING
PETITION FOR REHEARING

Plaintiffs and Appellant,
Case No. 910196-CA
Department of Business
Regulation, Utah Securities
Division,
Defendants and Appellees.

THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon appellant's
Petition for Rehearing, filed February 25, 1992,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the appellant's Petition for
Rehearing is denied.

Dated this

£:

FOR THE COURT:

Mary «iT / Noonan
ClerkVbf the Court

day of March, 1992.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 9th day of March, 1992, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR
REHEARING was deposited in the United States mail to each of the
parties listed below:
David H. Day
Phillip B. Shell
Day & Barney
Attorneys at Law
4 5 East Vine Street
Murray, UT 84107
R. Paul Van Dam
State Attorney General
David N. Sonnenreich
Assistant Attorneys General
Tax & Business Regulation Division
115 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER DENYING
PETITION FOR REHEARING was hand-delivered to the trial judge of
record listed below:
The Honorable Leonard H. Russon.
Utah Court of Appeals Judge
230 South 500 East, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
Dated this 9th day of March, 1992.
7
By

SL*Ut^

/ I /Us/

Deputy Clerk
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R. PAUL VAN DAM, #3312
Attorney General
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Assistant Attorney General
DAVID N. SONNENREICH, #4917
Assistant Attorney General
Fair Business Enforcement Unit
115 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1331
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

In the matter of the following
Issuers, their Securities,
Affiliates or Successors,
and/or Entities subsequently
;
organized by them, including
'
H & B CARRIERS, INC., et al.
]
CAPITAL GENERAL CORPORATION,
;1 ORDER
Petitioner,

vs.
|
UTAH SECURITIES DIVISION AND
THE DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS
REGULATION,

Case No. 885900053MI
Judge LEONARD H. RUSSON

Respondents. ;

The Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Rule 11
Sanctions came on for hearing at 10:00 a.m. on August 13, 1990.
The petitioner was represented by David H. Day of the law firm of
Day & Barney, and the defendants were represented by David N.

Sonnenreich of the Utah Attorney General's Office.

After

reviewing the file and hearing the arguments of counsel, this
Court issued a Ruling on August 14, 1990. This Order follows.
ORDER, JUDGMENT AND DECREE
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED THAT:
1.

The petitioner's Petition for Review is hereby dismissed

with prejudice, the petitioner's claims therein having been
barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel; and
2.

The petitioner, Capital General Corporation, and its

counsel, David H. Day and Phillip B. Shell of the law firm of Day
and Barney, are hereby sanctioned for violating Rule 11 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and are hereby ordered, jointly
and severally, to pay to the Office of the Attorney General of
the State of Utah the sum of $1395.00, representing reasonable
attorneys' fees.y
SO ORDEREDTOIS ^P^^DkY

OF

vJ^/^W

, 1990.

By The Court

Honoraolle Led
trict Court Judge
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BEFORE THE SECURITIES DIVISION
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION
Cfr THE STATE OF UTAH

In the matter of the following issuers, their
securities, affiliates or successors, and/or entities
subsequently organized by them, including:

:
:
:

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND RECOMMENDED ORDER
Case No. SD-87-09-28-01

H & B Carriers, Inc., et. al.

Appearances:
William B. McKean for the Division of Securities
David H. Day for Capital General Corporation
By the Administrative Law Judge:
The instant proceeding was initiated pursuant to the issuance of a Petition, dated December 1,1987. By
Order, also dated December 1,1987, the division suspended all transactional exemptions applicable, or which may
subsequently become applicable, as to the registration of the securities at issue. Capital General Corporation
thereafter requested that the matter be set for hearing.
Pursuant to notice duly served by certified mail, this matter came on regularly for hearing on January 20,
1988 before J. Steven Eklund, Administrative Law Judge for the Department of Business Regulation. Thereafter,
evidence was offered and received.
The administrative law judge, being fully advised in the premises, now enters the following findings of fact,
conclusions of law and recommended order.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Capital General Corporation was incorporated under the laws of the Slate of Utah on March 9,1971.
David R. Yeaman and Jeri Pettersson are the directors of Capital General Corporation and respectively hold the offices
of president and vice president. Ms. Pettersson is the registered agent of Capital General Corporation.
2. At various times during 1986, Capital General Corporation incorporated approximately forty-six (46)
companies and caused them to go public by distributing their securities through gifts to approximately 700 to 1,000
individuals with whom Capital General Corporation had been associated. The distribution was typically made to

donees derived from a list of approximately 1,500 individuals, of whom 450 were residents of this state.
3. The first company gifted by Capital General Corporation was Elkin Weiss & Co., Inc. Elkin Weiss &
Co., Inc. was incorporated under the laws of the State of Utah on January 7,1986. At the time of incorporation,
Elkin Weiss & Co., Inc. was named Amenity, Inc. Julie Harmon, Cynthia Paskett and Ms. Pettersson were the
incorporators and directors of Amenity, Inc. Ms. Pettersson was the registered agent for Amenity, Inc.
4. Amenity, Inc. was initially capitalized when Capital General Corporation' transferred S2,000 to it in
exchange for one million shares of its' authorized common stock, which represented approximately 1% of all
outstanding common stock authorized. Thereafter, Capital General Corporation gifted, to approximately 700 to
1,000 individuals, a unit of one hundred (100) shares of the stock it had acquired. None of those securities were
registered with the division when they were gifted to such individuals.
5. On June 5,1986, the division initiated an administrative action to suspend trading of Amenity, Inc.
securities because those securities had been gifted and such gifts allegedly violated the registration provisions of the
Utah Uniform Securities Act. On July 9,1986, four million shares of Amenity, Inc. were purchased by Elkin Weiss
and Co., Inc. for 525,000. At that time, Elkin Weiss & Co., Inc. was a California corporation . Thereafter,
Amenity, Inc. changed its name to Elkin Weiss and Co., Inc.
6. On September 25,1986 and January 20,1987, hearings were conducted in the just-referenced
administrative proceeding as to Amenity, Inc. On February 18,1987, the Securities Advisory Board and the
Executive Director of the Department of Business Regulation issued an order suspending the use of all secondary
trading exemptions relative to Amenity, Inc. securities on the basis that the public distribution effected by the gifting
of those securities was made to evade and circumvent the disclosure required by registration and could not qualify
under the ngood faith gift" exception contained in Section 61-l-13(15)(d)(i).
7. On April 16,1987, Amenity, Inc. filed a petition in district court seeking review of the just-described
order. Commencing September 11,1987, Warren Brown Securities Company, Inc., a Utah broker/dealer, Greentree
Securities, Inc., a Rorida broker/dealer, and Dillon Securities, Inc., a Washington State broker/dealer made markets in
Elkin Weiss & Co., Inc. securities and have continued to do so. On September 18,1987, the order previously
entered by the Securities Advisory Board and the Executive Director of the Department of Business Regulation was
upheld on review by the district court. That matter is presently pending before the Utah Court of Appeals.
8. Respondent H&B Caniers, Inc. was incorporated under the laws of the State of Utah on
July 1,1982. That entity was initially known as Y Travel. Jerry W. Peterson and Mr. Yeaman had incorporated Y
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Travel and the registered agent of that entity was Ms. Pettersson.
9. Similar to Amenity, Inc., H&B Carriers, Inc. was initially capitalized when Capital General Corporation
transferred $2,000 to it in exchange for authorized common stock. Similar to Amenity, Inc., Capital General
Corporation thereafter gifted, to approximately 700 to 1,000 individuals, a unit of 100 shares of the stock it had
acquired. Many of the donees were residents of Utah.
10. None of H&B Carriers, Inc. securities were registered with the division at the time those securities were
gifted. Further, neither that corporation nor its securities were subject to an exemption from registration
requirements pursuant to filing with the division at that time.
11. Sparing detail, the December 1,1987 Petition sets forth factual allegations substantially similar to those
identified above as to the mode of incorporation, the subsequent acquisition and gifting of stock in the forty-five (45)
other companies under review. In each case, the essential transaction consisted of the initial transfer of securities for
a relatively small amount of money and the gifting of those securities to numerous individuals. In certain instances,
the gifted securities were subsequently traded on the secondary market None of the corporate entities in question or
the securities which were gifted were registered with the division and no exemptions from registration requirements
were ever issued as to those securities.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The division initially asserts that no basis exists to vacate the December 1,1987 Order as to any of the
corporate entities not represented in the instant proceeding. The division concedes that Capital General Corporation
is an interested party which has standing to challenge that order, but contends that none of the named companies in
the December 1,1987 Petition have requested a hearing as to the validity of the order. Given the foregoing, the
division asserts there is no basis to grant those companies relief from the continued operation of that order.
The division next contends that the December 1,1987 Order should be summarily affirmed, inasmuch as the
facts presented herein are similar to those upon which an order suspending the use of secondary trading exemptions
was previously entered in the case of Amentiv. Inc. (Case No. SD-86-11). To reinterate, the division asserts that the
gifting of securities constituted the disposition of those securities for value and there is no exemption which exists to
otherwise obviate compliance with registration requirements.
Section 61-1-14(3), Utah Code .Ann. (1953), as amended, provides:
Upon the entry of a summary order, the division shall promptly notify all interested
parties that it has been entered and of the reasons therefor and that within 15 business days of
the receipt of a written request, the matter will be set down for hearing . . . . If a hearing is
requested or ordered, upon approval by the executive director and a majority of the Securities
3

interested parties, may affirm, modify, or vacate tne o r d e r . . . . (Jbmpnasis aaaec;.
Inasmuch as Capital General Corporadon is eidier the sole owner or holds majority control of die various companies
under review, that affiliation renders Capital General Corporation as an interested party for purposes of this
proceeding. It necessarily follows that Capital General Corporation may challenge the validity of the summary order
which was issued and, if that order were to be vacated, the order would be of no further force and effect as to any of
the companies in question.
Capital General Corporation urges that the sale of a security refers to a purchase consisting of an exchange of
a security for money and necessarily excludes the gifting of a security where no such monetary exchange occurs.
Alternatively, Capital General Corporation asserts that a good faith gift was made in each instance and, thus, any
such transaction was excluded from compliance with registration requirements. Specifically, Capital General
Corporation contends that it made inquiry of the division whether the gifting of unregistered securities was
permissible. Thus, Capital General Corporation assertstiiatit has desired to comply with the law at all times.
Finally, Capital General Corporation urges that the protections afforded by registration through the Utah Uniform
Securities Act relate only to those individuals who have parted with money and, significandy, there is no evidence
that any individuals have been damaged by reason of the unregistered status of the securities at issue.
Section 61-1-7 provides:
It is unlawful for any person to offer or sell any security in this state unless it is
registered under this chapter or the security or transaction is exempted under Section 61-1-14.
Section 6i-l-13(15)(a) defines "sale" or "sell" to include:
. . . ever>' contract for sale of, contract to sell, or disposition of, a security or interest
in a security for value.
"Offer" and "offer to sell" are defined in Section 61-l-13(15)(b) to include:
. . . every attempt or offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy, a security
or interest in a security for value.
Section 61-l-13(15)(d)(i) further provides that the above-defined terms do not include a "good faith" gift.
In Technomedical Labs. Inc. v. Utah Securities Division. 744 P.2d 320 (Utah App. 1987), the Utah Court of
Appeals stated as follows:
The purposes of securities acts in general are to prevent fraud and to encourage
disclosure of information through registration, thereby protecting investors from the sale of
fraudulent and worthless speculative securities. Id at 322.
The Court further quoted die following language from Payable Accounting Corp. v. McKinlev. Utah, 667 P.2d 15
4

(1983), to wit:
Securities laws are remedial in nature and should be broadly and liberally construed to
give effect to the legislative purpose. Id at 17-18.
There are two pivotal issues in the instant case. The first is whether the gifting of stock represents the
disposition of a security for value within the meaning of the above-quoted statutes. It is instructive that, in
Technomedical Labs Inc. v. Utah Securities Division, supra, the Court noted two cases in which the issue addressed
was whether the distribution of a subsidiary's unregistered shares as a dividend to the parent company's shareholders
constituted a "sale" requiring registration under the Federal Securities Act of 1933. In its review of Securities and
Exchange Commission v. Datronics Engineers. Inc.. 490 F.2d 250 (4th Cir. 1973) and Securities and Exchange
Commission v. Hanvvn Industries Corp.. 326 F.Supp. 943 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), the Court summarized the rationale of
those cases as follows:
Whether a "sale" has occurred depended upon whether the distribution was "for
value". Both courts held value would be gained by the creation of a public market... Such
value includes: (1) an enhanced ability to borrow; (2) an enhanced ability to raise equity;
(3) the availability of a method of valuing assets; (4) an enhanced liquidity of assets; and
(5) the prestige associated with publicly held companies. Id. at 324.
The Court further noted the Department's conclusion that the term uvalue", as defined in the above-cited cases, was
substantially synonymous with the term "benefit" which was the language under review in Technomedical Labs Inc.
v. Utah Securities Division, supra. Significantly, the Court concluded that the Department's interpretation of the Act
and its rulings "fall within the bounds of reasonableness and rationality." Id. at 325.
What constitutes "value", as identified by the decisions quoted herein, parallels the meaning of "value" bet
forth in Sections 61-l-13(15)(a) and (b). As was true in Amenitv. Inc.. the transactions under review in the instant
case involved the creation and/or maintenance of good will and the resulting beneficial exposure of Capital General
Corporation's business in various areas. Such represents the value envisioned by the just-cited statutes.
Importantly, the gifting of securities in each of the transactions under review facilitated the creation of a public
market for those securities. As Mr. Yeaman stated in an October 2,1987 letter issued by Capital General
Corporation to the donees of the gifted securities:
During 1986, you received shares of stock from Capital General as gifts for your
past association and loyalty to us. It was our intention to use these gifts as a way of
benefitting you economically and at the same time helping private individuals, corporations,
etc. to "go public" and increase and enhance the value of the gifts.
Clearly, the gifting of those securities constituted a disposition for value and the sale of a security, as defined in
Section 61-M3(15)(a).
5

The only remaining issue is whether the disposition of the securities represented a "good faith gift" exempted
from compliance with the registration requirements set forth in Section 61-1-7 by reason of the applicability of
Section 61-l-13(15)(d)(i). As was true in Amenity. Inc., the division again asserts that the transfer of the securities
from Capital General Corporation to the donees constitutes a subterfuge designed to avoid registration requirements
mandated by statute and/or rule, the implication being that the transfer was not one made in "good faith". In
Amenity. Inc.. it was noted that there was no exemption or exception which had been demonstrated to exist relative
to the distribution of securities in that case and that no registration of those securities had been sought or granted.
Concededly, the term "{good faith gift" is not defined by statute. However, Capital General Corporation's
assertion that "good faith" exists because inquiries were made in legal and regulatory circles as to whether securities

7
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could be gifted without being registered is misplaced. The question of intent, relative to whether a "good faith gift"
exists, is one which necessarily involves examination of not only whether the issuer subjectively desires to comply
•*—

— . — _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

with registration requirements, but whether the absence of compliance and the operative results of the distribution are
such as to effectively obtain the benefits of a public market in securities absent the protection which registration
would offer to prospectrveTnvestors of the gifted securities.
^^AYith£uu_doubt^^^

securities do not constitute that class of potential investors who may

be in need of information which would be available if the securities were registered. Having invested nothing when
they were given the securities, the donees are simply conduits through whom the unregistered securities could be
subsequently purchased by third parties. As Mr. Yeaman noted in his October 2,1987 letter, most of the donees of
the gifted securities "have made at least some significant paper profits by our program."
However, it is the creation of a secondary trading market for those securities which then prompts the
requirement that information be made available through registration for review by those prospective investors who
may contemplate the purchase of securities which could be potentially worthless. Further, the fact that those who
have purchased the unregistered securities have not yet suffered financial loss should not operate to compel the
division to blithely await that possibility. The salutary purposes served by diligent enforcement of securities laws
and the protection made available to the investing public through registration compels the conclusion that the mere
potential for damage is a sufficient basis upon which to prevent the trading of unregistered securities.
In summary, the nature of the transactions under review establishes that the "good faith gift" provision set
forth in Section 61-l-13(l5)(d)(i) does not apply in the instant case. Thus, the distribution of the securities in
question constitutes the unregistered sale of a security violative of Section 61-1-7.

\
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RECOMMENDED ORDER
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the December 1,1987 Order is affirmed.
Dated this

day of April, 1988.

i. Steven Eklund
(Administrative Law Judge

BY THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR:
The foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order is hereby accepted,
confirmed, and approved by the Executive Director of the Department of Business Regulation.
Dated this

.day of April, 1988.

William E. Dunn, Executive Director

BY THE SECURITIES ADVISORY BOARD:
The foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order is hereby accepted,
confirmed, and approved by the Utah Securities Advisory Board.
Dated this

V^

day of April, 1988.
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61-1-7

SECURITIES DIVISION—REAL ESTATE DIVISION

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 69 Am. Jur. 2d Securities
Regulation — State §§ 19 to 24.
C.J.S. — 53 CJ.S. Licenses §§ 74, 77; 79
C.J.S. Supp. Securities Regulation §§ 223 to
226.
A.L.R. — Churning: stockbroker's liability
for allegedly "churning" or engaging customer's account in excessive activity, 32
A.L.R.3d 635.
\i

Law practice: what activities of stock or security broker constitute unauthorized practice
of law, 34 A.L.R.3d 1305.
Mistake: effect, as between stockbroker and
customer, of broker's mistaken sale of stock or
other security other than that intended by customer, 48 A.L.R.3d 513.
Key Numbers. — Licenses <s=> I8V2 (38), 38;
Securities Regulation <s=> 270, 274, 277.

61-1-7. Registration before, sale.
It is unlawful for any person to offer or sell any security in this state unless
it is registered under this chapter or the security or transaction is exempted
under § 61-1-14.
History: C. 1953, 61-1-7, enacted by L.
1963, ch. 145, § 1; L. 1979, ch. 218, § 2; 1983,
ch. 284, § 10.
Amendment Notes. — The 1983 amend-

ment deleted "or to offer to purchase in connection with a takeover" after "sell"; and substituted "chapter" for "act."

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Purpose of corporation.
Motives and purposes set forth in bylaws but
not found in the articles of incorporation could
not be considered in determining the question

of registration of securities. State ex rel. Sec.
Comm'n v. Lake Hills, 14 Utah 2d 14, 376 P.2d
540 (1962)(decided under former law.)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — The Utah Take-Over
Offer Disclosure Act: Constitutional and Practical Considerations, 1979 Utah L. Rev. 583.
Utah Legislative Survey — 1979, 1980 Utah
L. Rev. 155.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 69 Am. Jur. 2d Securities
Regulation — State § 25 et seq.
C.J.S. — 53 C.J.S. Licenses §§ 75, 76; 79
C.J.S. Supp. Securities Regulation § 195.
A.L.R. — Corporate officer or agent: what

amounts to participation by corporate officer or
agent in illegal issuance of security in order to
impose liability upon him under state securities regulations, 44 A.L.R.3d 588.
Attorney's preparation of legal document incident to sale of securities as rendering him
liable under state securities regulation statutes, 62 A.L.R.3d 252.
Key Numbers. — Licenses «=» I8V2 (35); Securities Regulation «» 247.

61-1-8. Registration by notification.
(1) The following securities may be registered by notification, whether or
not they are also eligible for registration by co-ordination under § 61-1-9:
(a) any security whose issuer and any predecessors have been in continuous operation for at least five years if there has been no default
during the current fiscal year or within the three preceding fiscal years in
the payment of principal, interest, or dividends on any security of the
issuer, or any predecessor, with a fixed maturity or a fixed interest or
dividend provision, and the issuer and any predecessors during the past
three fiscal years have had average net earnings, determined in accordance with generally accepted accounting practices, (i) which are apphca-

under the provisions of the trust or other agreement UU UUL m u u u w .
(i> A good faith giftr
or instrument under which the security is issued.
(ii) A transfer by death;
(d) With respect to an equipment trust certifi(iii) A transfer by termination of a trust or of
cate, a conditional sales contract, or similar securities serving the same purpose, "issuer" means the a beneficial interest in a trust;
(iv) A security dividend not within clauses
person by whom the equipment or property is to be
(cXv)or(vi);
used.
(v) A securities split or reverse split; or
(e) With respect to interests in partnerships,
(vi) Any act incident to a judicially approved
general or limited, "issuer" means the partnership
reorganization in which a security is issued in exchitself and not the general partner or partners.
(f) With respect to certificates of interest or ange for one or more outstanding securities, claims,
participation in oil, gas, or mining titles or leases or or property interests, or partly in such exchange and
in payment out of production under the titles or partly for cash.
(16) "Securities Act of 1933," "Securities Exchleases, "issuer" means the owner of the title or lease
or right of production, whether whole or fractional, ange Act of 1934," "Public Utility Holding
who creates fractional interests therein for the Company Act of 1935," and "Investment Company
Act of 1940" mean the federal statutes of those
purpose of sale.
(12) "Nonissuer" means not directly or indirectly names as amended before or after the effective date
of this chapter.
for the benefit of the issuer.
(17) "Security" means any note; stock; treasury
(13) "Person" means an individual, a corporation,
a ' partnership, an association, a joint-stock stock; bond; debenture; evidence of indebtedness;
company, a joint venture, a trust where the interests certificate of interest or participation in any profitof the beneficiaries are evidenced by a security, an sharing agreement; collateral-trust certificate;
unincorporated organization, a government, or a preorganization certificate or subscription; transferable share; investment contract; burial certificate or
political subdivision of a government.
(14) "Promoter" means any person who, acting burial contract; voting-trust certificate; certificate
alone or in concert with one or more persons, takes of deposit for a security; certificate of interest of
initiative in founding or organizing the business or participation in an oil, gas, or mining title or lease
or in payments out of production under such a title
enterprise of a person.
^f(15Ka) "pale* or "sell" includes every contract for or lease; or, in general, any interest or instrument
sate of* contract to sell, or disposition of, a security commonly known as a "security," or any certificate
of interest or participation in, temporary or interim
or uitcrat in a security for value.
iV*u(b) "Offer" or "offer to sell" includes every certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant
attempt or offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the
dffer to buy, a security or interest in a security for foregoing. "Security" does not include any insurance
or endowment policy or annuity contract under
value.
J&VT (c) The following are examples of the definit- which an insurance company promises to pay money
in a lump sum or periodically for life or some other
ions in subsections (a) and (b):
c;
(i) Any security given or delivered with or as specified period.
a^ bonus on account of any purchase of a security or
(18) "State" means any state, territory, or posseany other thing, is part of the subject of the purc- ssion of the United States, the District of Columbia,
hase, and has been offered and soldiouqjue.
and Puerto Rico.
1*3
r I (ii) A purported gift of assessableslock is an 61-1-14. Exemptions.
offer or sale as is each assfefancm-tcvifed on the ./ (1) The following securities are exempted from
stock;
^
i
Sections 61-1-7 and 61-1-15:
; « i (iii) An offer or sale of a security that is
(a) any security, including a revenue obligation,
convertible into, or entitles its holder to acquire or issued or guaranteed by the United States, any state,
subscribe to another security of thesam^or another any political subdivision, of a state, or any agency or
issuer is an offer or sale of that security; and also corporate or other instrumentality of one or more of
an offer of the other security, whether the right to the foregoing, or any certificate of deposit for any
convert or acquire is exercisable immediately or in of the foregoing;
the future.
(b) any security issued or guaranteed by
*-?
(iv) Any conversion or exchange of one* sec- Canada, any Canadian province, any political suburity for another shall constitute an offer or sale of division of any such province, any agency or corpthe security received in a conversion or exchange, orate or other instrumentality of one or more of the
and the offer to buy or the purchase of the security foregoing, or any other foreign government with
converted or exchanged*
which the United States currently maintains diplo(v) Securities distributed as a r dividend matic relations, if the security is recognized as a
wherein the person receiving the dividend surrenders •valid obligation by the issuer or guarantor;
the right, or the alternative right, to receive- a cash
(c) any security issued by and representing an
or property dividend is an offer or sale. -<
interest in or a debt of, or guaranteed by, any bank
(vi) A dividend of a security of another issuer organized under the laws of the United States, oi
is an offer or sale.
any bank, savings institution, or trust company
-'
(vii) The issuance of a security under a supervised under the laws of any state;
merger, consolidation, reorganization, recapitaliza(d) any security issued by and representing at
tion, reclassification, or acquisition of assets shall interest in or a debt of, or guaranteed by, an]
constitute the offer or sale of the security issued as federal savings and loan association, or any buildinj
well as the offer to buy or the purchase of any sec- and loan or similar association organized under th<
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loan association, or similar association organized
and supervised under the laws of this state;
(0 any security issued or guaranteed by any
railroad, other common carrier, public utility, or
holding company which is subject to the jurisdiction
of the interstate commerce commission; a registered
holding company under the Public Utility Holding
Company Act of 1935 or a subsidiary of such a
company within the meaning of that act; regulated
in respect of its rates or in its issuance by a governmental authority of the United States, any state,
Canada, or any Canadian province;
(g) any security listed on the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation
System, the New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange, or on any other stock exchange or medium approved by the division, provided
that the division may at any time suspend or revoke
this exemption for any particular stock exchange,
medium, security,, or securities under Subsection 611-14(3); any other security of the same issuer
which is of senior or substantially equal rank to any
security so listed and approved by the division; any
security called for by subscription rights or warrants
so listed or approved; or any warrant or right to
purchase or subscribe to any of the foregoing;
r- (h) any security issued by any person organized
land operated not for private profit but exclusively J
for religious, educational, ^benevolent, charitable;
fraternal, social, athletic, or reformatory purposes,
or as a chamber of commerce or trade or professional association; and any security issued by a corporation organized under Chapter 1, Title 3 and any
security issued by a corporation to which the provisions of such chapter are made applicable by compliance with the requirements of Section 3-1-21;.
l~ (i) any commercial paper which arises out of a
current transaction or the proceeds of which have
been or are to be used for current transactions, and
which evidences an obligation t a pay cash within
nine months of the date, of issuance, exclusive of
days of grace, or any, renewal, guarantee, or guarantee of renewal, of .the paper which, is likewise
Bnuted*
"
. . . .
r ~ - 0) any investment contract issued in connection
twith an employees9-' stock purchase, savings,
pension, profit-sharing, or similar benefit plan;.
fjMfc flr} affY c*nirity n? trr "•u:iu Mr^'Hrm hy r l f
or g p w K~A~ »i—^ y ^ ^ ^ p ,»c ;^ t necessary or
^ ( ? ) The following transactions are exempted from
jgwions 61-1-7 and 61-1-15:^ ..
* \ ( a ) any isolated transaction, whether effected
•rough a broker-dealer or not;
>l**'(b) any nonissuer transaction in an outstanding
| * * * y if: (i) it is listed in a recognized securities
r " ^ such as Moody's and Standard & Poor's
*«**rities manuals where the listing contains the
of the issuer's officers and directors, a
- sheet of the issuer as of a date within 18
** and a profit and loss statement for either
* c a l year preceding that date or the most recent
J * operations; or (ii) the security has a fixed
/_ or a fixed interest or dividend provision
there has been no default during the current
!***r or within the three preceding fiscal years,
^ ^ i l h c existence of the issuer and any prede-

(c) any nonissuer transaction effected by or
through a registered broker-dealer pursuant to an
unsolicited order or offer to buy;
(d) any transaction between the issuer or other
person on whose behalf the offering is made and an
underwriter, or among underwriters;
(e) any transaction in a bond or other evidence
of indebtedness secured by a real or chattel mortgage or deed of trust, or by an agreement for the
sale of real estate or chattels, if the entire mortgage,
deed of trust, or agreement, together with all the
bonds or other evidences of indebtedness secured
thereby, is. offered and sold as a unit;
(f) any transaction by an executor, administrator, sheriff, marshal, receiver, trustee in bankruptcy, guardian, or conservator;
(g) any transaction executed by a bona fide
pledgee without any purpose of evading this
chapter;
(h) any offer or sale to a bank, savings institution, trust company, insurance company, investment
company as defined in the Investment Company Act
of 1940, pension or profit-sharing trust, or other
financial institution or institutional buyer, or to a
broker-dealer, whether the purchaser is acting for
itself or in somefiduciarycapacity;
(i) any offer or sale of a preorganization certificate or subscription if: (i) no commission or other
remuneration is paid or given directly or indirectly
for soliciting any prospective subscriber; (ii) the
number of subscribers acquiring any legal or beneficial interest therein does not exceed ten; and (iii)
there is no general advertising or solicitation in
connection with the offer or sale;
^\^
0X0 any transaction pursuant to an offer by an ^
issuer of its securities to its existing securities
holders, if no commission or other remuneration,
other than a standby commission is paid or given
directly or indirectly for soliciting any security
holders in this state, if the transaction constitutes:
(AJ the conversion of convertible securities; (B) the
exercise of nontransferable rights or warrants; ( Q
the exercise of transferable rights or warrants if the
rights, or warrants are exercisable not more than 90
days after their issuance; or (D) the purchase of
securities under a preemptive
right;
1
> ^ - (ii) .the exemption created by Subsection I
OXjXO » n ° * available* for an offer or sale of sec\
unties to existing securities holders who have acqu\
ired then* securities from the issuer in a transaction
\
in violation of Section 61-1-7;
-^^—)
s >" (k) any offer, but not a sale, of a security for
which registration statements have been filed under j
both this chapter and the Securities Act of 1933 if j
no stop order or refusal order is in effect and no I
public proceeding or examination looking toward j
such an order is pending;
' 0) a distribution of securities as a dividend if
the person distributing the dividend is the issuer of
thesecurities-distributed;
" ** (m) 'any nonissuer transaction effected by or
through* a registered broker-dealer where the
broker-dealer or issuer files with the division, and
the* broker-dealer maintains in his records, and
makes reasonably available upon request to any
person expressing an interest in a proposed transaction in the security with the broker-dealer information nr^erihed bv the division under its rules;

Utah Condominium Ownership Act, wnetner or nut
to be sold by installment contract, if the provisions
of the Utah Condominium Ownership Act, or if the
units are located in another state, the condominium
act of that state, the Utah Uniform Land and Timeshare Sales Practices Act, and the Utah Uniform
Consumer Credit Code are complied with;
(p) any transaction or series of transactions
involving a merger, consolidation, reorganization,
recapitalization, reclassification, or sale of assets, if
the consideration for which, in whole or in part, is
the issuance of securities of a person or persons,
and if:
(i) the transaction or series of transactions is
incident to a vote of the securities holders of each
person involved or by written consent or resolution
of some or all of the securities holders of each
person involved;
(ii) the vote, consent, or resolution is given
under a provision in: (A) the applicable corporate
statute or other controlling statute; (B) the controlling articles of incorporation, trust indenture, deed
of trust, or partnership agreement; or (C) the controlling agreement among securities holders;
(iii)(A) one person involved in the transaction
is required to file proxy or informational materials
under Section 14(a) or (c) of the Securities Exchange
A c t of 1934 or Section 20 of the Investment
Company Act Of 1940 and has so filed; (B) one
person involved in the transaction is an insurance
company which is exempt from filing under Section
tl2(gX2)(G) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
and has filed proxy or informational materials with
the appropriate regulatory agency or official of its
domiciliary state; or ( Q all persons involved in the
.transaction are exempt from filing under Section
.|2(gXl) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and
file with the division such proxy or informational
material as the division requires by rule;
:< ».- • (iv) the proxy or informational material is
filed with the division and distributed to all securities holders entitled to vote in the transaction or
series Of transactions at least ten business days prior
t o any necessary vote ,by the securities holders or
action on any necessary consent or resolution; and
(v) the division does not, by order, deny or
revoke the exemption within ten business days after
filing of,the proxy or informational materials; > T (q) any transaction as to which the division, by
rule or order, finds that registration is not necessary
or appropriate for the protection of investors.
$X3) Upon approval by the executive director and a
majority of the Securities Advisory Board, the executive director may by order deny or revoke any
exemption specified in Subsection (l)(h) or (1)0) or
jta. Subsection (2) with respect to: (a) a specific security, transaction, or series of transactions; or (b)
any person or issuer, any affiliate or successor to a
person or issuer, or any entity subsequently organized by or on behalf of a person or issuer generally.
N o such order may be-entered without appropriate
prior notice to all interested parties, opportunity for
hearing, and written findings of fact and .conclusions of law,, except that the division may by order
summarily deny or revoke any of the specified exemptions pending final determination of any proceeding under this subsection. Upon the entry of a
«iimmarv order, the division shall promptly notify

or division, the order will remain in effect unoi u is
modified or vacated by the executive director. If a
hearing is requested or ordered, upon approval by
the executive director and a majority of the Securities Advisory Board the executive director, after
notice of and opportunity for hearing to all interested persons, may affirm, modify, or vacate the
order or extend it until final determination. The
executive director may not extend any summary
order for more than ten business days. No order
under this subsection may operate retroactively. No
person may be considered to have violated Section
61-1-7 or 61-1-15 by reason of any offer or
sale effected after the entry of an order under this
subsection if he sustains the burden of proof that he
did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care
could not have known, of the order.
IOT
61-1-14.5. Borden of proving exemption.
In any proceeding under this chapter, civil, criminal, administrative, or judicial, the burden of
proving an exemption under section 61-1-14 or an
exception from a definition under section 61-1-13
is upon the person claiming the exemption or exception.
1983
61-1-15. Filing of sales literature.
The division may by rule or order require the
filing of any prospectus, pamphlet, circular, form
letter* advertisement, or other sales literature or
advertising, communication addressed or intended
for distribution to prospective investors, unless the
security or transaction is exempted by section 61-1-.
14.

1983

61-1-16. False statements unlawful.
It is unlawful for any person to make or cause to
be made, in any document filed with the division or
in any proceeding under this chapter, any statement"
which is, at the time and in the light of the circumstances under which it is made, false or misleading
in any material respect. vm
61-1-17. No finding by division on merits Contrary representation unlawful.
(1) Neither the fact that an application for registration or a registration statement has been filed nor
the fact that a person or security is effectively registered constitutes a finding by the division that any
document filed under this chapter is true, complete,
a n d n o t misleading: Neither'any• such-factJior the
fact that an exemption orex^don^fe^availabk for
a security or a-transaction means that the division,
has passed in any way upon the merits or qualifications of, or recommended or given approval to,
any person, security, or transaction. * "''•'
(2) It is unlawful to make, or cause to be made,
to any prospective purchaser, customer, or client
any representation inconsistent with subsection (1).
19t3

61-1-18. Division of securities established Director - Appointment • Functions.
(1) There is established within the department of
business regulation a. division, of securities. The
division shall be under the direction and control of a
director, appointed by the executive director with
the, governor's,approval. The director shall be responsible for the administration and enforcement of
this chapter. The director shall hold office at the
pleasure of the governor.
(2) The director, with the approval of the execuHv* director, may employ such staff as necessary to

61-1-20

SECURITIES DIVISION—REAL ESTATE DIVISION

61-1-20. Enforcement action authorized — Bond not required.
Whenever it appears to the division that any person has engaged, is engaging, or is about to engage in any act or practice constituting a violation of this
chapter or any rule or order under this chapter, it may take the following
action:
(1) (a) issue an order directing the person to appear before the division
and show cause why an order should not be issued directing the
person to cease and desist from engaging in the act or practice, or
doing any act in furtherance of the activity;
(b) the order to show cause shall state the reasons for the order and
the date of the hearing;
(c) the division shall promptly serve a copy of the order to show
cause upon each person named in the order; and
(d) the division shall hold a hearing on the order to show cause no
sooner than ten business days after the order is issued. After a hearing, the division may issue an order to cease and desist from engaging in any act or practice constituting a violation of this chapter or
any rule or order under this chapter. The order shall be accompanied
by written findings of fact and conclusions of law. If any person
named in the order to show cause fails to appear at the hearing, then
an order to cease and desist may be issued against that person.
(2) bring an action in the appropriate district court of this state or the
appropriate court of another state to enjoin the acts or practices and to
enforce compliance with this chapter or any rule or order under this
chapter. Upon a proper showing the court may:
(a) issue a permanent or temporary, prohibitory or mandatory injunction;
(b) issue a restraining order or writ of mandamus;
(c) enter a declaratory judgment;
(d) appoint a receiver or conservator for the defendant or the defendant's assets;
(e) order disgorgement;
(f) order rescission;
(g) impose a fine of not more than $500 for each violation of the
act; and
(h) enter any other relief the court considers just. The court may
not require the division to post a bond.
History: C. 1953, 61-1-20, enacted by L.
1963, ch. 145, § 1; L. 1983, ch. 284, § 29;
1986, ch. 107, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amendment added Subsections (l)(a) through (l)(d);
redesignated part of the former introductory
language as present Subsection (2); redesig-

nated former Subsections (1) through (6) as
present Subsections (2)(a) through (2)(f); added
Subsection (2)(g); redesignated former Subsection (7) and the final sentence as present Subsection (2)(h); and made minor stylistic
changes,

